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Some of the more dramatic headlines surrounding the new surveillance law, the Investigatory Powers Bill (‘IP Bill’)
which is currently making its way through parliament, have surrounded its impact on popular messaging apps such
as WhatsApp, Apple’s iMessage and many more. Will the IP Bill ‘ban’ what is generally known as ‘end-to-end
encryption’, where the content of a message can only be read by those at either ‘end’ and not by those in the middle,
including the provider of the app, such as WhatsApp or Apple themselves? Will it force the providers of apps to build
in ‘back doors’ to allow the authorities access to the messages?
Parliamentary Committees wanting clarity
The answers to both of those questions, unfortunately, are far from clear. It wasn’t clear in the first draft of the IP Bill
in November 2015 – so unclear that all three of the parliamentary committees that looked at the bill asked for further
clarity. The Science and Technology Committee said in its report that:
“There is some confusion about how the draft Bill would affect end-to-end encrypted communications, where
decryption might not be possible by a communications provider that had not added the original encryption.”
The Intelligence and Security Committee said in its report that:
“Some CSPs have expressed serious concern as to this seemingly open-ended and unconstrained power,
suggesting that this may lead to banning end-to-end encryption. The Home Office must ensure that the legislation
provides clarity as to the nature and scale of these obligations.”
The specially convened Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill said in its report that:
“The Government still needs to make explicit on the face of the Bill that communication service providers (CSPs)
offering end-to-end encrypted communication or other un-decryptable communication services will not be expected
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to provide decrypted copies of those communications if it is not practicable for them to do so.”
However, when the new draft of the Bill came out in March, the changes did not seem to be sufficient. Though the
Home Office claimed it was creating clarity, few readers of the Bill, the codes of practice that accompanied it and
even the special ‘factsheet’ on encryption’  that followed a few days later, felt that there was very real change – or
sufficient clarity. The Home Office went some way towards what was recommended, but left enough vagueness to
cause considerable concern.
Technical Capability Notices
The possible requirement to remove or bypass encryption is covered in what are termed ‘Technical Capability
Notices. The relevant part of the draft bill says:
“The Secretary of State may give a relevant operator a notice (a “technical capability notice”)—
(a) imposing on the relevant operator any applicable obligations specified in the notice, and
(b) requiring the person to take all the steps specified in the notice for the purpose of complying with those
obligations.”
These obligations could include:
“obligations relating to the removal by a relevant operator of electronic protection applied by or on behalf of that
operator to any communications or data;”
On the face of it, this looks as though it might require the ‘relevant operator’ to remove encryption – something
which would fundamentally undermine end-to-end encryption. Putting in ‘by or on behalf of’ goes part way to
meeting the Science and Technology Committee objection – but what ‘on behalf of’ means is debatable. There are
further caveats built into the Bill, caveats which the Home Office seems to think cover the problems. The Secretary
of State must take into account whether the notice is ‘technically feasible’ and the obligations imposed must be
‘practicable’. It is in these two terms that the real problem lies. Both are vague and subjective – and leave any
operator of a messaging service in significant doubt as to what they might be asked to do.
There are further problems for the messaging services. If they are served with such a notice, they cannot disclose
that fact without the permission of the Secretary of State – so amongst other things they cannot find out whether
other operators have attempted to comply or not. Notices can be applied whether the operator is in the UK or
overseas – but enforcement overseas could be very difficult, leaving the UK technology industry in a more
vulnerable position.
Underlying problems
The underlying problems may be even more significant. The technology industry worldwide is moving towards the
idea of strong encryption that the providers themselves cannot – and will not attempt to – break. The current conflict
between Apple and the FBI over the protection applied to the iPhone of the San Bernadino shooter has shown that
Apple will fight very hard to keep that protection – and most of the technology industry has come out very strongly on
Apple’s side of the battle.
There are good reasons for this – and fundamental problems with the approach taken by the Home Office in the
Investigatory Powers Bill as a result. As their Factsheet on Encryption puts it, with reference to ‘terrorists and
paedophiles’:
“It is absolutely crucial that there is not a guaranteed safe space online in which these individuals can communicate,
beyond the reach of our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies.”
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The problem is, if this ‘guaranteed safe space’ is denied to these individuals, then it is denied to all individuals. End-
to-end encryption is essentially intended to provide exactly this guaranteed safe space to all individuals. If the Home
Office, therefore, really intends to deny this, then no matter what it says to the contrary, then it does seek to ban or
fundamentally undermine end-to-end encryption.
That, at present, appears to be what the Investigatory Powers Bill says. Through Technical Capability Notices, it
allows the Secretary of State to demand that the encryption built in to a messaging app be broken by the provider of
that app. Arguments about whether this is ‘practicable’ and ‘technically feasible’ do not provide sufficient protection
for the app providers to feel secure: the pressure to ‘find a way’ could well become intolerable.
In the end, however, it is likely that the Home Office is fighting a losing battle. Theresa May is setting herself up,
Canute-like, to try to hold back a tide towards strong encryption that is likely to be irresistible. It may be a long time,
however, before she and others in similar positions are willing to accept this.
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